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SUMMARY 
On the partial evidence so far available, it seems likely that there was a slight 
decline in economic activity in the final quarter of 1992. However, the economy 
had been expanding quite rapidly before the September currency crisis, so that 
the annual growth rate of real GNP in 1992 is estimated at 2% per cent. 
The conditions of international uncertainty and very high domestic interest 
rates, which were responsible for the downturn in late 1992, have persisted for 
most of the first quarter of 1993. It is thus reasonable to assume that the 
economy continued to stagnate or decline. The restoration of industrial 
competitiveness through the devaluation of the Irish pound, the subsequent 
reduction in domestic interest rates, and the injection of substantial EC capital 
funds should all help to reverse this decline. 
Nevertheless the outlook for 1993 remains very uncertain, and this 
uncertainty is likely to be compounded by the absence of trade statistics for the 
first half of the year. Any forecast must be regarded as tentative, and subject 
to a large margin of error. With this proviso, the least unlikely outcome for 1993 
is a growth of real GNP of about 1 per cent, price inflation of 3 per cent, 
consolidation of the current account balance of payments surplus at about 6 per 
cent of GNP, and a small decline in the average number at work. 
Given the high level of uncertainty and the likelihood of very low economic 
growth, short-term economic policy must inevitably be defensive, seeking to 
mipimise the danger of job losses rather than looking for an unobtainable 
immediate increase in employment. The core element of this defensive policy 
is the need to reduce wholesale and retail interest rates. The cautious fiscal 
targets set in the Budget have helped to initiate this process, and there are good 
reasons to expect that interest rates will return to their pre-crisis levels by the 
middle of the year. · 
Having demonstrated that fiscal responsibility will be maintained, the 
government now needs to establish confidence in its broader economic 
management. The new ERM parity must continue to be defended firmly, price 
inflation must be kept low, and a credible long-term employment policy must 
be evolved. A key element of all these requirements is a sound medium-term 
pay strategy, which will consolidate the competitive gains of devaluation and 
avoid undue future pressure on the public finances. An agreement to replace 
the expiring PESP could be useful in this context, but only if its pay provisions 
are very moderate. With or without a new national agreement, there is urgent 
need for a modification of the process of public service pay determination, so 
that, in future, fairness can be combined with flexibility and realism. 
While 1993 is likely to prove a very difficult year for the Irish economy, there 
is a real possibility that rapid growth will be resumed from 1994. Decisions 
taken this year can determine whether the next period of growth remains non-
inflationary and can be converted into a sustained increase in employment. 
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ESTIMATED NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 1992 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
1991 1992 
Preliminary' Estimated 
£m £m 
Private Consumer Expenditure 15616 16522 
Public Net Current Expenditure 4387 4810 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 4603 4679 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 16893 18694 
Physical Changes in Stocks ... 557 -220 . 
Final Demand 42056 44485 
less: 
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 15072 15730 
GDP at Market Prices 26984 28755 
less: 
Net Factor Payments (F) 2865 3048 
GNP at Market Prices 24119 · 25707 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
1991 1992 
Preliminary' Estimated 
£m £m 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 1791 2078 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 13620 14403 
Other: 6890 7476 
less: 
Adjustments 736 1200 
Net Factor Payments 2865 3048 
National Income 18700 19709 
Depreciation 2684 2818 
GNP at Factor Cost 21384 22527 
Taxes less Subsidies 2735 3180 
GNP at Market Prices 24119 25707 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
1991 1992 
Preliminary' Estimated 
£m £m 
X-M 1821 2963 
F - 2865 - 3048 
Net Transfers 1969 1752 
Balance on Current Account 925 1667 
as% of GNP 3Y+ · 6Y, 
• Adjusted for revised Balance of Payments Estimates 
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Change in 1992 
£m % 
Value Volume Value Price Volume 
906 468 5Y+ 2 y. 3 
423 162 9Y. 5 y. 3Y. 
76 -28 i:v. 2 y.; - y, 
1801 1757 JOY. V. 10 Y, 
- 777 - 770 
2429 1589 SY. 1 y. 3 y. 
658 760 4 y.; - :y. 5 
1771 829 6 y, 3 y.; 3 
183 179 6 y, V. 6 V. 
1588 650 6V, 3% 2% 
Change in 1992 
£m % 
287 16 
783 5% i 586 8 y, I 
I 
I 464 63 l 183 6 y, 
I 
1009 5 I 
134 5 ! 
1143 5 
I 445 16 V. 
1588 6 y, I 
i 
1 
Change in 1992 
£m 
1142 
-183 
- 217 
742 
2Y+ 
FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 1993 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
1992 1993 Change in 1993 
Estimated Forecast £m % 
£m £m Value Volume Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 16522 17307 785 289 4Y+ 3 1 Y+ 
Public Net Current Expenditure 4810 5111- 301 48 6 V. 5 V. 1 
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation 4679 4882 203 97 4V. 2 V. 2 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 18694 19468 774 562 4V. 1 3 
Physical Changes in Stocks ... - 220 -80 140 130 
Final Demand 44485 46688 2203 1126 5 2 y, 2 y, 
less: 
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 15730 16712 982 641 6 V. 2 V. 4 
GDP at Market Prices 28755 29976 1221 485 4 V. 2 y, 1 Y+ 
less: 
Net Factor Payments (F) 3048 3275 227 198 7 y, 6 y, 
GNP at Market Prices 25707 26701 994 287 3 Y+ 2Y+ 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
1992 1993 Change in 1993 
Estimated Forecast 
£m £m £m % 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2078 2140 62 3 
Non-Agricultural : Wages, etc . 14403 15159 756 5 V. 
Other 7476 7838 362 4Y+ 
less: 
Adjustments 1200 1300 100 8 V. 
Net Factor Payments 3048 3275 227 7 y, 
National Income 19709 20562 853 4V. 
Depreciation 2818 2959 141 5 
GNP at Factor Cost 22527 23521 994 4 y, 
Taxes less Subsidies 3180 3180 0 0 
GNP at Market Prices 25707 26701 994 3Y+ 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
1992 1993 Change in 1993 
Estimated Forecast 
£m £m £m 
X-M 2963 2756 - 207 
F - 3048 - 3275 - 227 
Net Transfers 1752 2102 350 
Balance on Current Account 1667 1583 -84 
as% of GNP 6 y, 6 - y, 
7 
COMMENTARY 
The International ·Economy 
General 
Divergent growth trends in the major economies make it difficult to predict 
the course of world output in 1993 with confidence. The USA and Canada have 
already entered the recovery phase of their economic ·cycles, and North 
American growth in the second half of 1992 now appears to have been 
significantly stronger than was believed at the time. Continued growth is 
expected in 1993, although it is expected to be steady rather than dramatic. 
Conversely, Germany and Ja pan are still in recession, and, despite some 
hopeful signs, the timing of their recovery remains a major uncertainty. Most 
other west European economies are currently in a state of near stagnation, and 
their return to a positive growth path is dependent on developments in 
Germany, and, to a lesser extent, on the strength of US growth. 
It is reasonable to hope that the positive elements in the world economic 
outlook will outweigh the negative in 1993, and that world output and trade will 
expand less sluggishly than in 1992. Even so, most forecasts place world output . 
growth no higher than 2 per cent in 1993 with the volume of trade rising by 
less than 5 per cent. 
The US Economy 
The recovery in the US economy in the second half of 1992 was moderately 
strong, with current estimates of real GDP growth 3.4 per cent in the third 
quarter and 2. 7 per cent in the fourth. The main contributions to this growth 
were personal consumption and business inventories. Most indicators suggest 
that this moderate growth is continuing in 1993, but there is no clear sign yet 
of the surge of rapid expansion which has tended to characterise the upswing 
in most post-war US business cycles. 
The pace of growth in the remainder of 1993 will obviously be influenced by 
the economic policies of the new Administration. Most of the measures 
outlined in the State of the Union address will take several months to implement, 
and will probably be modified in the process. Nevertheless, the reaction to the 
proposals, even before implementation, will be important through its impact 
on consumer and business confidence. It is thus reassuring that the initial 
response, in terms of public approval and of government bond prices, appears 
to have been favourable. 
Under the proposals, mild stimulation in the form of infrastructure 
investment is likely to precede current spending cuts and higher taxes, so that 
the fiscal impact should be expansionary in the short-term and restrictive in the 
longer-term, when it is hoped that underlying economic growth will be 
stronger. Provided that fiscal policy does, in practice, conform to this anti-
cyclical time path, it is likely to be reinforced by monetary policy. This will 
remain relaxed in the immediate future, but will probably be tightened later 
in the year as the recovery becomes more fully established. 
8 
I 
i 
It is by no means impossible that US growth will accelerate sharply in th~ 
course of 1993. However, it is much more likely that the persisting private-
sector debt overhang and sectoral weaknesses, particularly in defence-related 
industries, will continue to act as inhibiting influences. Thus the general 
expectation is that real GDP will grow by about 3 per cent in 1993 as a whole, 
leading to only a minor improvement in employment. With a 3 per cent rate 
of economic growth and a labour market remaining relatively slack, strong 
inflationary pressures should be avoided, and prices are expected to rise by less 
than 3 per cent. Similarly, a 3 per cent growth rate would appear unlikely to 
result in a large increase in import volumes. 
The European Economy 
The ,EC economy appears to be in a state of virtual stagnation, with the 
German recession combining with tight monetary and fiscal policies to hold 
back growth throughout the Community. 
In Germany itself, the recession persists, and unemployment is rising quite 
sharply. Industrial output in December 1992 was 3.7 per cent lower than in the 
previous December. Investment is still tending to fall, personal consumption 
remains flat, and export performance is weak due to falling German 
competitiveness and the general lack of buoyancy in export markets. 
Most commentators expect some improvement in German economic growth 
in the course of 1993, although only sufficient to leave the annual growth rate 
for Germany as a whole at Y2 per cent or less. Annual output in the former 
West Germany is forecast to decline, despite a weak upturn in the second half 
of the year. The timing of even this limited recovery is uncertain, and depends 
to a considerable extent on the course of monetary policy. 
The very cautious reductions in interest rates so far sanctioned by the 
Bundesbank are not expected to have any impact on the volume of 
consumption or investment. Significant reductions in interest rates, which 
could stimulate activity, must await the Bank's perception that German 
inflationary pressures are firmly on the wane. Although there are already 
welcome indications that the size of pay claims is being reduced, the successful 
conclusion of the much-discussed Solidarity Pact could be the key to an 
effective change in monetary policy. This pact, which would amount to a 
formal consensus involving unions, employers and various levels of federal and 
regional government, aims to cover both income policy and the public finances, 
the two issues of most concern to the Bundesbank. Negotiations on the pact 
have inevitably been slow, but the recent agreement on the public finance 
aspects of the pact offers hope that the entire package will soon be completed. 
Until there is a significant easing of German monetary policy, it seems 
unlikely that there will be a resumption of sustained growth in the remainder 
of the continental EC. Until mid-1992, most of these countries appeared to be 
weathering the world recession relatively well, with annual growth rates 
typically around 2 per cent. However, the deepening recession in Germany, 
allied to the uncertainties and raised interest rates caused by currency 
instability within the ERM, interrupted this growth in the closing months of 
1992. Stagnation has exacerbated fiscal problems in most countries, and, 
despite rising unemployment,,, fiscal policy is likely to be tightened in 1993 in 
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an attempt to . adhere to Maastricht criteria. Individual countries face 
additional problems, such as political weakness and financial scandals in Italy, 
the likelihood of tension between President and government in France, and 
residual uncertainty over ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark. 
Despite these difficulties, the absence of excessive private sector debt offers 
the hope that most continental EC countries could respond quite rapidly to an 
easing of monetary policy and a reduction in the level of uncertainty. On 
balance, annual growth rates of between 1 and 2 per cent are expected in 1993, 
implying a considerably faster rate of growth in the second half of the year. 
Inflationary pressures are likely to remain weak. 
The UK Economy 
It is increasingly clear that the depreciation of sterling and the drastic 
reductions in interest rates since September have succeeded in halting .the 
decline in the UK economy which was gathering pace in the middle of 1992. 
What is not yet clear is whether the decline is being followed by stagnation or 
a gradual recovery. 
The indicators so far remain mixed, with favourable statistical releases 
tending to alternate with unfavourable. Consumer confidence remains low, 
partly due to fear of unemployment, and the burden of private debt is still an 
inhibiting factor on consumption. Although business confidence has improved 
since the autumn, it remains low by historical standards and no significant 
increase in business investment has yet taken place. Despite the depreciation 
of the currency, price inflation has been falling, and pay increases, at less than 
5 per cent in December, are at their lowest level for several years. 
Government policy, with regard to economic management and to industrial 
strategy continues to appear confused. Because another reduction in short-
term interest rates cannot be ruled out if unambiguous evidence of economic 
growth does not soon appear, the risk of a further depreciation · of sterling 
remains present. The initial report of the new advisory panel of economists has 
reduced this risk in the short term. As the year progresses it seems probable 
that official policy will gradually revert to a more anti-inflationary stance. 
Despite the negative factors it seems probable that there will be a significant 
recovery in the UK economy under the twin stimuli of low interest rates and 
the substantial improvement in competitiveness. Unfortunately the recovery 
will be difficult to monitor fully, due to the absence of full trade statistics in the 
first half of the year, when past experience suggests that the currency 
depreciation should be beginning to have a beneficial effect on the volume of 
net exports. There is thus some danger that monetary policy will remain lax 
for too long, boosting growth in 1993 at the expense of adding to the underlying 
inflationary pressures in the economy. 
Although it is too early to be certain, the most likely outcome for 1993 is that 
the UK growth rate will be stronger than most commentators, including the 
UK government, currently expect. Given that there will be a negative growth 
carryover from 1992, an annual rise of 2 per cent in real GDP in 1993, which 
seems likely, _would imply quite rapid growth in the course of 1993. Almost 
inevitably, such growth would lead to a substantial rise in the rate of inflation, 
taking it above the upper limit of the official target range of 1 to 4 per cent 
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before the end of the year. This, in turn, could lead the authorities to raise 
short-term interest rates in the second half of the year, even though interest 
rates in the rest of Europe should be tending to decline. 
The Rest of the World 
Like Germany, Japan is still suffering from a technical recession. Unlike 
Germany, Japanese monetary and fiscal policies are openly expansionary, with 
the Central Bank discount rate now at 2 Y2 per cent and the 10. 7 billion yen 
fiscal stimulation package now being implemented following the passing of the 
budget for fiscal 1992 in December. Uncertainties generated by financial 
scandals and by reduced asset values could continue to hold back the recovery 
of domestic demand, but on balance it seems likely that the economy will 
respond to fiscal and monetary stimulus in the course of 1993. The timing 
remains uncertain, with significant expansion probably being delayed until the 
second half of the year. Real GNP for 1993 as a whole is expected to be in the 
region of 2 per cent, compared with an outturn of 1.6 per cent in 1992. Inflation 
is likely to remain very low at under 2 per cent. 
TABLE 1: Short-term International Outlook 
Consumer Hourly Unemployment Current Account 
GNP Prices Earnings Rate Balance 
Percentage Change % % of GNP 
Country 1992 1993 1992 1993 1992 1993 1992 1993 1992 1993 
UK - :v. 2 3% 3 y, 6% 6y., 10 10:V. -2 -2Y. 
Germany 1 y.; 4 3% 4Y, 5y., 6% 7% - 1 y, -1% 
France 1% 1 y, 2% 2 y, 4 4 JOY. 10:V. y, y.; 
Italy ly., 1 5y., 5 y, 6 y, 6 y, 11 11 y, -2 -2 
Total EC 1 1 4 3 y, 5 y, 5 10 10% -1 -1 
USA 2 3 2 y, 2% 3 3y., 7 y, 7 y.; -% -1 
Japan 1 y, 2 2 1 Y, 3 y.; 2V. 2 2V. 3y., 3 y, 
Total (OECD) 1 y, 1% 3 y, 3y., 5 3% 8 BY. - y.; - y.; 
Ireland 2% 3 3 4 y, 4 16* 17 Y. * 6 y, 6 
*See Footnote to Table 8. 
The other industrial Asian economies have continued to grow rapidly 
throughout the recession. Further growth is expected in 1993. Many Latin 
American countries have also made considerable economic progress in the last 
year or so, and with the upturn in the US economy this progress should be 
sustained in 1993. 
Economic decline has been acute in Eastern Europe in the past two years. 
This decline could be coming to an end in the former satellite countries, 
although the prospects remain daunting for most member countries of the 
former USSR. Most members of OPEC should benefit mildly from an upturn 
in world demand for oil in 1993, but no major rise is expected in crude oil prices 
in the near future. 
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The Context for Ireland 
The economic environment for 1993 remains characterised by uncertainty. 
With regard to growth of export markets, the most likely outcome is a: very 
slight improvement on current depressed levels in the course of 1993, but a 
slight weakening of annual growth rates compared with 1992. The European 
market in particular is expected to remain stagnant until quite late in the year. · 
However, a decline in import volumes in Ireland's major European partners 
cannot be ruled out if the German recession intensifies, or if growth in other 
European countries is prevented by a continuation of very high interest rates. 
Conversely, more rapid market growth is possible if the US recovery 
accelerates, and if there is an early reversal of German monetary policy. Given 
this uncertainty, it is prudent to anticipate difficult trading conditions for Irish 
industrial exports for most of the year. · 
While doubts persist concerning the direction of the European economy, and 
while the EMS is dogged by instability, it would be unreasonable to assume any 
upturn in productive private investment within the European Community. 
Thus, although Ireland's long-term competitive advantage in seeking 
international investment should remain strong, the pool of such investment to 
be attracted during 1993 is likely to be limited .. . 
Short-term competitiveness in export markets is obviously affected by 
exchange rate movements. Currency fluctuations are always difficult to predict, 
and with speculative pressure in the ERM still active, predictions are more · 
than usually hazardous. For the purpose of this Commentary, we assume that 
FIGURE 1: Exchange Rates 
IR£ Price of Unit of Foreign Currency, Quarterly Averages, 1987=100 
140 ....--------------------------.--------, 
FORECAST 
120 1-----------------------------11--------; 
D.MARK 
801-----------------------------11--------; 
60 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 . 3 4 1 2 3 4 
I 1988 I 1989 I 1990 1991 I 1992 I 1993 , I 
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there will be no further realignment within the ERM in 1993, that both the US 
dollar and the Japanese yen will tend to appreciate against European currencies 
in the course of the year, and that, after some fluctuations, sterling will 
~trengthen to end the year at slightly above parity with the Irish pound. 
These currency assumptions would be compatible with a gradual, but 
substantial, reduction in German and related interest rates in the next few 
months, and with approximate stability in short-term interest rates in the US, 
UK and Japan. The next move in interest rates in these three countries is likely 
to be upwards, but will probably not take place until late in 1993. 
In summary, the external economic environment appears significantly less 
favourable than was predicted in our Autumn Commentary. This is primarily 
because the German recession has proved to be deeper than was expected, and 
shows signs of spreading to other European economies, while the restoration 
of stability in the ERM and reductions in German interest rates are coming 
more slowly than was then assumed. 
The Domestic Economy 
General 
There have been many major economic developments since the publication 
of the Autumn Commentary in early December. As already discussed, prospects 
for the European economy appear to have deteriorated significantly, with the 
German recession proving deeper and more influential than expected. The 
uncertainty created by a poorer growth outlook has been intensified in much 
of Europe by continuing pressure on the ERM. 
Domestically, interest rates remained very high from December to February, 
negating our assumption that there would be an early reduction towards pre-
crisis levels. Even since devaluation, the pace of interest rate reductions 
suggests that average interest rates in 1993 will be somewhat above the level 
assumed in the Autumn Commentary. 
These negative external and domestic developments are to some extent 
counterbalanced by the devaluation itself. At the time of writing, this has 
restored the effective exchange rate of the Irish pound to roughly the same level 
as in early 1992. This obviously has improved short-term competitiveness 
compared with the appreciation of over 5 per cent implicit in the previous 
assumption of an unchanged ERM parity. If our expectation of some 
appreciation in the US dollar and sterling in the course of the year is justified, 
then there will be some further improvement in average competitiveness. 
The impact of the Budget is unlikely to be significantly different from our 
previous fiscal assumptions. The current budget deficit implies a slightly 
tighter stance than we assumed on current spending and taxation, but this is 
offset by a more expansionary public capital programme. 
The final factor which affects our estimates for 1992 and forecasts for 1993 
is the substantial revision to the Balance of Payments Estimates for earlier years. 
The revised figures modify our understanding of economic processes in the 
years from 1985 to 1991. More immediately, they pose the technical question 
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of how to amend the National Accounts tables to ensure balance between the 
expenditure and income accounts. As the revised service trade figures for the 
years from 1986 to 1990 were based largely on information already 
incorporated in the Income estimates of the latest National Income· and 
Expenditure, there seems no case for revising estimates of nominal .GDP, as 
derived from the incomes table. Thus, balance has been achieved by revising 
upwards the estimates of personal consumption, which is derived as a residual 
in the National Accounts. Although this has the effect of substantially reducing 
estimates of the personal savings ratio in recent years, it does not significantly 
affect the forecasts of economic growth in 1992 and 1993. 
Exports 
Not surprisingly, the seasonally corrected value of exports levelled off in the 
closing months of 1992, after its rapid growth in the first half of the year. So 
far as agricultural exports are concerned, this reflected mainly the reduction 
in export sales of dairy produce but of intervention, which was inevitable as 
dairy stocks neared exhaustion. 
The check in the growth of industrial export values is more critical. Until 
export price indices for the full period in_ question are available, it will remain 
unclear just how much of the lower value trend was due to price reductions 
following the depreciation of sterling. Average export prices were tending to 
decline even before sterling left the ERM, and fell further in October. It thus. 
seems probable that the volume of industrial exports continued to grow in the 
final quarter, although more slowly than in the earlier part of the year, and that 
average prices fell significantly. 
TABLE 2: Exports of Goods and Services 
1991 % Change 1992 % Change 1993 
£m Volume Value £m Volume Value £m 
Agricuhural 2251 26 25 2814 -5 - 2 V. 2744 
Manufactured 10526 9 V. 9 y. 11506 4 V. 5 12081 
Other Industrial 2066 4Y. 3 V. 2140 3 V. 3 V. 2205 
Other 181 -8% -8% 165 0 1 167 
Total Visible 15025 II 10% 16625 2 V. 3 V. 17197 
Adjustments -350 - 275 - 270 
Merchandise 14675 11 V. 11 V, 16350 2% 3 V. 16927 
Tourism 1218 0 3 1254 4 7 1342 
Other Services 1000 6 9 1090 7 10 1199 
Exports of Goods and Services 16893 IOY, 10% 18694 3 4 y. 19468 
Total visible exports in 1992 rose by 10% per cent in value; and are estimated 
to have risen by 11 per cent in volume, implying a fall in average prices of about 
V4 per cent. With intervention stocks not being sent for storage abroad in 1992, 
unlike earlier years, the balance of payments adjustment to the trade statistics 
is likely to have been significantly smaller than in 1991. Merchandise exports 
are thus estimated to have increased by 11 Y2 per cent in both value and volume. 
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Official tourist statistics show that there was an increase of over 4 per cent 
in the · number of visitors to Ireland in 1992. However, the same source 
estimates that earnings from tourism rose by only 2 Y4 per cent in the first 9 
months of the year, in spite of the increase in numbers. This implies that 
spending per head was lower, perhaps due to a shorter average stay. For the year 
as a whole, it seems likely that tourism earnings rose by about 3 per cent, 
implying an unchanged volume of tourism exports, when the value increase is 
deflated by the consumer price index. 
The revised Balance of Payments Estimates, as expected, show that other service 
exports have been expanding more rapidly in recent years than had previously 
been recorded. In the light of this trend, and of preliminary estimates for the 
first half of the year, there is likely to have been an increase of about 9 per cent 
in the value of other service exports in 1992 . 
As shown in Table 2, total exports of goods and services in 1992 are thought 
to have risen by about 10 per cent in value, and 10!1:! per cent in volume. Given 
the uncertain trading environment for much of the year, this represents a 
considerable achievement, and underlines the strong competitive position 
reached by Irish exporters before the currency crisis. 
Prospects for 1993 remain difficult to assess, and the hiatus in trade statistics 
for the first half of the year will make it hard to monitor emerging trends. It 
seems certain that there will be some fall in the volume of agricultural exports, 
as the very high 1992 levels reflected an unsustainable rate of liquidating 
intervention stocks of dairy produce. The resultant change in the composition 
of agricultural exports should result in an increase in average prices, even in 
the likely absence of price increases for most specific products. 
Manufactured export volume could increase at less than half its 1992 rate. 
Although the UK domestic market is likely to grow more rapidly than last year, 
the improved competitiveness of UK producers could limit import growth. For 
many Irish exporters, the lengthy period when an unfavourable exchange rate 
coincided with high interest rates must have resulted in some loss of orders. 
Probable trends in post-devaluation exchange, interest, and inflation rates 
should restore much of the lost competitiveness vis a vis the UK, but the usual 
lags could mean that the results will not be seen until late in the year. 
Compared with most continental European countries, the devaluation of the 
Irish pound has given Irish industrial exporters a significant competitive 
advantage. However, most of the large exporters to continental countries are 
not in particularly cost sensitive industries, and manufactured exports to the 
continent are more likely to be held back by the general sluggishness of the 
market than stimulated by improved margins. 
Despite devaluation, it seems probable that market conditions will preclude 
major price rises in Irish pound terms. Indeed, unless there is an unexpectedly 
rapid rise in the value of sterling, it seems likely that average industrial export 
prices for 1993 as a whole could be only marginally higher than in 1992. 
Thus total visible exports in 1993 are tentatively forecast to rise by about 2 !I:! 
per cent in volume and 3 !I:! per cent in value. Given no significant change in 
the balance of payments adjustment, merchandise exports should increase by 
a similar amount. 
The recovery of the US economy and the greater value of the dollar could 
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encourage a significant increase in the number of American tourists in 1993. 
However, the stagnant state of the continental economy and the depreciation 
of sterling are likely to restrict the number of European visitors, including the 
British. Overall, tourism exports could grow rather faster than in 1992, but are 
unlikely to return to the high growth rates of the late '80s. · 
Extrapolating the trends of recent years, other service exports can be 
expected to increase by about 10 per cent in value. On this basis, the value of 
total exports of goods and services is projected to increase by about 4Y4 per cent 
in 1993, and the volume by 3 per cent. It must be stressed, however, that these 
export forecasts are subject to a greater margin of error than is normal at this 
time of the year. 
Stocks 
It now appears that the turnaround in stockbuilding in 1992 was even greater 
than had been thought, from a rise of £557 million in. 1991 to a fall of about 
£220 million. Given that there is thought to have been a moderate increase in 
farm stocks and a largely involuntary rise in industrial and distribution stocks, 
the fall in intervention ·and related stocks was even more dramatic, as shown 
in Table 3. 
TABLE 3:· Stock Changes 
1991 Change in Rate 1992 Change in Rate 1993 
£m £m £m ·£m £m. 
Livestock on Farms 27 28 55 -55 0 
Irish Intervention Stocks 1 535 -845 -310 210 - 100 
Other Stocks -5 40 35 - 15 20 
Total 557 - 777 -220 140 -80 
1Including subsidised private storage. 
Intervention stocks are expected to be reduced again in 1993, although the 
pace of reduction will be considerably slower than last year. Whereas in 1992 
the bulk of stock reduction was in dairy products, in 1993 the reduction will 
be concentrated on beef. While estimates of annual changes in intervention 
stocks made early in the year frequently prove to be misti;lken, a fall of about 
£100 million appears to· be a reasonable forecast. 
The build-up of farm stocks seems likely to come to an end ·in 1993, as the 
incentive for maximising herd size as a basis for calculating future CAP 
benefits will no longer apply. An unchanged level of farm stocks is thus forecast. 
With slow economic growth expected for most of the year, it seems unlikely that 
there will be a significant increase in industrial and distribution stocks. A 
modest reduction of about £80 million in total stocks is thus projected for 1993. 
Investment 
The economic uncertainty and high interest rates which followed the 
September 1992 currency crisis obviously had an adverse effect on capital 
investment. It now seems probable that there was a slight fall in the volume of 
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gross fixed capital formation in 1992, with a 2 per cent decline in the volume 
of investment in machinery and equipment outweighing a marginal rise in the 
volume of building and construction. 
The fall in private sector investment, both in building and machinery, is 
believed to have continued in the first quarter of 1993. Even if interest rates fall 
quite sharply in the remainder of the year, the un~ertainty generated by the 
events of the past six months seems likely to discourage any rapid recovery in 
private investment. Given the usual lags in converting intentions into actual 
capital expenditure, even the full restoration of confidence in the second half 
of the year would be likely to increase private investment in 1994 rather than 
1993. Thus private sector capital formation is likely to be considerably lower 
in 1993 than in 1992, with reductions probable in the volume of almost all 
categories of investment. 
TABLE 4: Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
1991 % Change 1992 % Change 1993 
£m Volume Value £m Volume Value £m 
Building and Construction 2545 V, 3 2621 2 V, 5 2752 
Machinery and Equipment 2058 -2 0 2058 I V, 3 V, .2130 
Total 4603 - V, 1% 4679 2 4 y. 4882 
In these circumstances, it is particularly fortunate that increased EC funding 
will enable a large rise in. public capital spending, as outlined in the Public 
Capital Programme and the Budget. This rise, concentrated on infrastructure 
investment, but including equipment as well as building and construction, 
should outweigh the decline in private investment. As shown in Table 4, modest 
increases are forecast for the volume of capital formation in both building and 
equipment. 
Consumption 
For most of 1992 the retail sales index charted a substantial rise in both the 
value and the volume of personal consumption. However, under the influence 
of economic uncertainty and very high interest rates, the seasonally corrected 
retail sales index showed a sharp decline in November and December. For the 
year as a whole, the value of retail sales rose by about 5.1 per cent with the 
volume increasing by about 3 per cent. Allowing for a faster increase in non-
retail consumption, including tourist spending abroad, the value of personal 
consumption probably rose by about 5% per cent in 1992. As Table 5 
illustrates, this was a significantly faster consumption growth than in the two 
preceding years, even on the basis of consumption figures adjusted upwards to 
compensate for the revisions to the balance of payments. The adjustments for 
earlier years have the effect of making consumption growth in the boom year 
of 1989 much more credible than the previous estimate. Conversely, the 
consumption increases in 1988 and 1991 are now perhaps slightly exaggerated. 
If our income estimates are roughly correct, an increase of 5% per cent in 
the value of personal consumption implies a rise of almost % per cent in the 
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TABLE 5: Consumption Indicators 
Annual Percenta.ge Change 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1992 1993 
To Date Forecast Forecast 
Co11m111ptio11 Value 
NIE 1991, Personal Consumption* 8.1 9.6 4.3 3.9 5.8 4.8 
Retail Sales Index, Value 4.8 9.2 4.8 1.8 5.1 5.1 4.3 
Divergence 3.3 0.4 -0.5 2.1 0.7 0.5 
Consumption Volume 
NIE 1991, Personal Consumption• 5.5 5.7 2.6 0.7 3.0 1.8 
Retail Sales Index, Volume 2.1 4.7 2.7 -0.2 3.2 3.0 1.3 
Divergence 3.4 1.0 -0.1 0.9 0 0.5 
Consumer Prices 
NIE 1991, Personal Consumption 
Dellator 2.6 3.8 1. 7 3.2 2.8 3.0 
Retail Sales Index Dcllator 2.6 4.3 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 3.0 
Consumer Price Index 2.1 4.0 3.4 3.2 3.0 3.0 
*Adjusted to conform with revised Balance of Payments Estimates. 
personal savings ratio in 1992. This is likely to have taken place entirely in the 
last quarter of the year, as personal consumption appears to have been at least 
keeping pace with disposable incomes in the first nine months. 
Interest rates and uncertainty have almost certainly kept personal 
consumption depressed in the first quarter of 1993, although no figures are yet 
available to confirm this. The key question for the remainder of the year is how 
FIGURE 2: Consumption 
Quarterly Averages Seasonally Adjusted, 1987=100 
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rapidly consumption will respond to the lowering of interest rates and the 
gradual lessening of uncertainty which are expected in the coming months. 
Even though Irish households are not burdened with the excessive debt which 
has held back the recovery of consumption in the UK, the shock inflicted in 
recent months by the currency crisis and associated events has been so deep 
that the recovery of consumer confidence is likely to be quite slow. 
Thus it seems prudent to assume no decline in the personal savings ratio in 
1993 as a whole. The slower growth expected in disposable incomes is therefore 
likely to restrict the increase in the value of personal consumption to about 4% 
per cent. With consumer prices likely to rise by about 3 per cent, this implies 
an increase of only 1 % per cent in the volume of personal consumption. 
Government consumption rose very sharply in 1992, with end-year 
expenditure figures suggesting increases of 9 % per cent and 3 % per cent in the 
value and volume of public net current expenditure respectively. Both figures 
were somewhat inflated by the bringing forward of expenditure, especially pay 
retrospection, from 1993, but even allowing for this the rate of increase was 
striking. A considerably slower rate of increase appears planned for 1993, with 
the volume of public consumption growing by about 1 per cent and the value 
by about 6!14 per cent. It is worth noting that even at this reduced rate of 
growth, the value of public authorities' net current spending is likely to nse 
faster than any other major component of expenditure on GNP. 
Final Demand 
Final demand in 1992 is estimated to have increased by 5 % per cent in value 
and 3 % per cent in volume. The volume increase was accounted for entirely 
by the rise in exports of goods and services, with the increase in domestic 
consumption, personal and public, rnore than offset by the heavy decline in 
stocks. The composition of final demand was of low import intensity, given the 
contributions to growth of agricultural exports and public consumption and the 
decline in the volume of investment in machinery and equipment. 
The growth of final demand in 1993 is forecast to be slower, with increases 
of 5 per cent in value and 2 Yz per cent in volume projected. The pattern of final 
demand is likely to be more import intensive than in 1992, although still much 
less so than in some recent years when investment in equipment, personal 
consumption and manufactured exports contributed a higher proportion of 
growth. It is worth noting that the revisions to the balance of payments figures 
have tended to raise the import elasticity of final demand, with the growth of 
multinational companies inducing a much higher level of service imports than 
had previously been reported. 
Imports 
As in the case of exports, it is difficult to apportion the levelling off in the 
value of visible imports in the closing months of 1992 between volume and price 
effects. As with exports, it seems most likely that the volume of imports 
continued to grow modestly, and that this was roughly offset by falling import 
pnces. 
For 1992 as a whole, it thus seems probable that the value increase of about 
2% per cent reflects a rise of about 4!14 per cent in the volume of visible 
19 
imports. Volume increases of 5 per cent or more in imports of consumer goods 
and industrial materials and components offset minor decreases in the volume 
of imports of capital goods and materials for use in agriculture, as shown in 
Table 6. 
TABLE 6: Imports of Goods and Services 
1991 % Change 1992 % Change 1993 
£m Volume Value £m Volume Value £m 
Capital Goods 1814 -1 -1 1796 · 2 4 y, 1877 
Consumer Goods 3620 5 3 y, 3747 4 5 y, 3953 
Intermediate Goods: 
Agriculture 466 -2 - 5Y, 441 -3 -1 437 
Other 6871 5 y, 3% 7130 4V. 6 y. 7576 
Other Goods 83 2 y, 2 y, 85 2 4 88 
Total Visible 12853 4V. 2% 13199 3 y, 5 y, 13931 
Adjustments - 165 -165 - 165 
Merchandise Imports 12688 4!,'. 2% 13034 3% 5 y, 13766 
Tourism 699 9 y, 13 790 4 7 845 
Other Services 1685 9 y, 13 1906 7 IOY. 2101 
Imports of Goods and Services 15072 5 4!,'. 15730 4 6!,'. 16712 
There is no reason to suppose that there was any significant change in the 
balance of payments adjustment, so trends in merchandise imports were the 
same as for visible imports. Expenditure on tourism abroad rose sharply, after 
two years of approximate stagnation in the value of tourism imports. The 
balance of payments revisions revealed that other service imports have been 
rising in recent years much more rapidly than had been realised. In line with 
this upward trend, figures for the first half of 1992 suggest that the annual value 
increase in other service imports was about 13 per cent. 
Thus total imports of goods and services are estimated to have risen about 
4V4 per cent in value and 5 .pet cent in volume in 1992. This volume growth 
is more than 3 times the revised 1991 increase, but well below the average for 
the preceding five years. · 
With the volume growth of final demand in 1993 expected to be considerably 
slower, but rather more import intensive, than in 1992, a slightly slower volume 
increase in visible imports is forecast. Depending on the country of origin, 
some import prices are likely to rise significantly in 1993 while others should 
remain below their 1992 av~~age levels, simply as a result of currency 
movements. Pricing decisions by suppliers are likely to modify the pure 
currency effects. In particular, imports from countries. such as Britain which 
have maintained a net depreciation against the Irish pound will have much of 
the currency fall offset by exporters' price increases. Nevertheless, with a 
significant negative carryover of import prices from 1992, and with world trade 
prices likely to remain weak, annual average import prices are projected to rise 
by no more than 2 per cent. 
A modest rise in the value of tourist spending overseas is forecast, while a 
slightly slower increase than last year- is projected for other service imports, due 
to the lower rate of g:owth expected in the Irish economy. 
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Total imports of goods and services are thus forecast to-increase by 4 per cent 
in volume, and by 6 V4 per cent in value. As with the export forecasts, however, 
the import projections must be treated as more than usually tentative, 
especially as they cannot be tested against actual trends in the trade statistics 
in the course of the year. 
Balance of Payments 
Despite the major downward rev1s10n in estimates of the current account 
surplus in recent years, it still seems certain that there was a very large surplus 
in 1992. As Table 7 shows, there was. a massive increase in the merchandise 
trade balance, which was more than sufficient to outweigh adverse trends in 
service trade, factor flows and net international transfers. Although it is £800 
million lower than our previous estimate, the new estimate of £1,667 million for 
1992 represents over 6 Y2 per cent of GNP, and confirms the earlier view that 
in the short to medium term the current account of the balance of payments 
is not a constraint on Irish economic growth. 
TABLE 7: Balance of Payments 
1991 Change 1992 Change 1993 
£m % £m % £m 
Visible Trade Balance 2172 57 Y, 3425 - 4:Y. 3266 
Adjustments - 185 -110 -105 
Merchandise Trade Balance 1987 67 3315 - 4:Y. 3161 
Service Trade Balance - 166 112 - 352 15 -405 
Trade Balance in Goods and Services 1821 63 2963 -7 2756 
Factor Flows: 
Profits etc. -2377 8 Y, - 2579 7 Y, - 2772 
National Debt Interest - 1031 -1031 8 - 1113 
Other Debit Flows - 1220 -6 - 1147 4 - 1193 
Total Debit Flows - 4627 2:Y. - 4757 6:Y. _,- 5078 
Credit Flows 1762 -3 1709 5 Y, 1803 
Net Factor Flows - 2865 6 Y, -3048 7 Y, - 3275 
Net Transfers 1969 -11 1752 20 2102 
Balance on Current Account 925 80 1667 -5 1583 
On the basis of our export and import forecasts, there could be a minor fall 
of about £150 million in the surplus on visible and merchandise trade in 1993. 
However, given the uncertainties outlined in the discussion of exports and 
imports, this projection must be treated with considerable caution. The newly 
discovered deficit on service trade seems likely to widen further, although much 
more slowly than in 1992. Thus the surplus on trade in goods and services is 
projected to decline by about 7 per cent, or roughly £200 million. 
The balance of payments estimates for the first half of 1992 indicate that 
profit outflows were increasing more slowly than we had expected. With 
multinational export trade not particularly buoyant, a continuation of this 
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relatively moderate increase in profit expatr.iation seems probable in 1993. 
Devaluation will increase the Irish pound cost of servicing the overseas national 
debt in 1993, while other current· debit flows, which are thought to have 
declined in 1992, are assumed to return to their more normal upward trend in 
1993. Thus total debit flows are projected to increase by 6%. per cent in 1993, 
compared with the unusually small increase of 2%. per cent estimated for 1992. 
Credit flows also seem to have declined in 1992, against their usual strong 
upward trend. A resumption of modest growth is assumed for 1993. Thus net 
factor flows are projected to increase by 7 Y2 per cent in 1993, slightly faster 
than the estimated 1992 increase. 
The probable deterioration in the trade balance and net factor flows will be 
largely offset by substantial rise in net international transfers, primarily from 
the EC. Thus the most probable olitturn for 1993 is that there will be a small 
decline in the value of the current account surplus, although as a proportion 
of GNP it should remain at the high level of 6 per cent, provided that the !at.est 
revisions to the balance of payments do represent an accurate base for 
measuring current flows. 
Agriculture 
Official estimates of agricultural output in 1992 show that growth was slightly . 
higher than we forecast in the Autumn Commentary. The volume of gross 
agricultural output rose by 2.8 per cent, with most of the rise due to increased 
livestock production. As expected, the volume of inputs continued to fall, so 
that the volume of gross agricultural product increased by over 7 per cent, 
contributing roughly Y2 per cent to the rise in real GNP. 
Although agricultural output is inevitably liable to be affected by weather 
conditions, at this stage of the ·year there is no reason to expect any significant 
change in the volume of gross output. Milk production is likely to be slightly 
below 1992 levels, but this should be offset by a modest increase in livestock 
production. The volume of inputs should continue to fall, suggesting that there 
could be an increase of about 1 per cent in the volume of gross agricultural 
product. 
Industry 
The industrial production index for the first eleven months of 1992' indicates 
that the annual rise in the volume of production in manufacturing industry is 
likely to have been over 10 Y2 per cent. For "all industries" the annual increase 
approached 10 per cent. The largest increase was in chemicals, but most 
industry groups shared in the annual rise. On a seasonally corrected basis it 
is clear that most of the annual growth in manufacturing output levels was 
achieved in the early months of the year, and that there was a considerable 
slowing of growth in the later months. . 
This slowdown implies that there will be only a modest carryover of about 
2 Y2 per cent in manufacturing growth into 1993. Output seems likely to remain 
roughly static in the early months of 1993, due to slack European demand for 
exports and the temporary loss of competitiveness vis a vis Uk competitors. 
Expansion seems likely to be resumed from about the middle of the year, but 
the annual increase in the volume of production in manufacturing industry will 
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FIGURE 3: Manufacturing Output 
Quarterly Averages Seasonally Adjusted, 1987=100 
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probably not exceed 5 per cent. This represents a modest upward revision to 
our previous forecast, mainly as a result of devaluation improving prospects for 
the traditional sector. 
A minor recovery is projected for the building and construction industry as 
a result of increased EC funding, so that gross output of the broad industry 
sector is forecast to rise by about 4 per cent in 1993, compared with about 7 
per cent in 1992. 
Services 
The value of output of the public services in 1992 was rather higher than had 
been expected. However, despite the upward revision to estimates of some 
service exports in recent years, it seems likely that the total output of private 
services in 1992 was weaker than we previously forecast. Thus the volume of 
output of the total service sector was probably about 2 per cent, much the same 
as our earlier estimate. 
Public service output is scheduled to increase more slowly in 1993, on the 
basis of Budget projections. With general economic growth likely to be subdued 
in 1993, the increase in the volume of private service output can also be 
expected to be slightly less than in 1992. An overall increase of about 1 Y2 per 
cent is thus forecast for the volume of services in 1993. 
Employment 
Despite the strong rise in manufacturing output in 1992, quarterly statistics 
indicate approximate stagnation in manufacturing employment. This 1s 
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particularly surprising as several labour intensive traditional industries shared 
in the general buoyancy of output. With both manufacturing and building 
employment likely to have fallen in the final quarter, average employment in 
the broad industry sector probably declined by about 5,000 in 1992 as a whole. 
With numbers in public employment once more increasing, total service 
employment is thought to have risen enough to outweigh the fall in industrial 
employment. Assuming the usual · decline in · the numbers engaged m 
agriculture, the total at work is likely to have remained roughly constant, or 
perhaps declined marginally,· as shown in Table 8. 
TABLE 8: Employment and Unemployment 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Services 
Total at Work 
Unemployed 
Labour Force 
*Unemployed Rate % 
Live Register 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Services 
Total at Work 
Unemployed 
Labour Force 
*Unemployed Rate % 
Live Register 
A: Mid-April Estimates 'OOO 
1990 1991 
167 154 
320 322 
639 649 
1126 1125 
179 208 
1305 1334 
13.2 14.7 
221 248 
B: Annual Averages 'OOO 
1990 1991 
160 152 
321 319 
645 655 
1126 1126 
185 216 
1311 1342 
13.4 14.9 
225 254 
1992 1993 1994 
150 147 144 
316 309 313 
659 663 668 
1125 1119 1125 
225 248 259 
1350 1367 / 1384 
15.7 16.9 17.5 
281 303 318 
1992 1993 
149 146 
314 310 
662 665 
1125 1121 
236 255 
1361 1376 
16: l 17.2 
283 308 
• New official rate based on ILO definitions. Because these refer to activit'y in the week preceding the Labour 
Force Survey, the unemployment rate cannot be derived directly from the figures in the table, which relate 
to principal economic sta tus as recorded in the Survey. 
Employment prospects in 1993 remain unfavourable. Even after devaluation, 
many indigenous firms are facing a squeeze on costs which . could result in job 
losses, although a minor upturn in manufacturing employment is possible .later 
in the year. The increase· in EC- financed .. construction is like~y to be less labour 
intensive than the expected reduction in private building. Service employment 
should continue to grow, but more slowly than in 1992, due to the general 
sluggishrn;ss of the economy and the tighter constraints on the volume of 
government current spending. Assuming a further decline in agricultural 
employment, the annual average total at work in 1993 could fall by about 4,000 .. 
Given the continuing rise in UK unemployment, emigration seems likely to 
remain l_ow, and the labour force to rise by perhaps 15,000 on an annual bjisis. 
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This implies a further substantial increase in unemployment, with the Live 
Register averaging about 308,000 and the unemployment rate about 17.2 per 
cent. 
Incomes 
Agricultural incomes rose sharply in 1992, with higher output prices and 
increased net subsidies reinforcing the increase in the volume of gross 
agricultural product. Official estimates place the increase in income arising in 
agriculture at 16.8 per cent, implying a rise of almost 16 per cent in incomes 
in the broad agricultural sector. At present it seems probable that there will be 
a much smaller increase of about 3 per cent in agricultural incomes in 1993, 
but unexpected price movements or abnormal weather conditions could change 
this outlook in either direction. 
The partial evidence of industrial and financial earnings data suggest that 
average private sector weekly earnings rose by about 4Y2 per cent in 1992. 
Average public service earnings were considerably higher, especially when 
allowance is made for the bringing forward into 1992 of retrospection due in 
1993. With a marginal increase in total non-agricultural employment, it is 
estimated that aggregate wages salaries and pensions rose by about 5 % per 
cent. 
Due largely to enhanced cost-consciousness, it seems probable that the 
increase in average private sector pay will be slightly slower in 1993, at just over 
4 per cent. Public service pay will again increase more rapidly than private 
sector, but not as rapidly as in 1992. With total non-agricultural employment 
roughly static, the increase in aggregate earnings in 1993 is projected at 5 Y4 per 
cent. 
Other non-agricultural income is always difficult to estimate, partly because 
the base for projection is generally about two years out of date. With this 
proviso, it seems likely that any increase in such incomes would have been very 
small in 1992. For most of the year, rates of interest were below the previous 
year's level, while dividends and other property income were far from buoyant. 
Income from non-agricultural self employment is likely to have reflected the 
relatively slow growth in domestic demand in 1991 and 1992. Due largely to the 
probability that average receipts from interest and other property income will 
be somewhat higher, other non-agricultural incomes are projected to rise by 
4Y2 per cent in 1993 compared with 1 per cent in 1992. 
Current transfers to the household sector are estimated to have increased by 
9% per cent in 1992, due mainly to higher unemployment and increased rates 
of benefit. An increase of 6 Y4 per cent in transfer income is projected for 1993. 
Thus, as shown in Table 9, gross personal income is estimated to have risen by 
about 6% per cent in 1992, and is forecast to rise at the slower rate of 574 per 
cent in 1993. 
Direct personal taxes, including PRSI contributions, increased by about 6% 
per cent in 1992. With gross incomes rising more slowly, but allowing for the 
impact of the temporary income levy, the increase in direct personal taxation 
seems likely to be about 6Y2 per cent in 1993. Thus personal disposable income, 
which is estimated to have risen by 6% per cent in 1992, is forecast to increase 
by 4% per cent in 1993. 
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TABLE 9: Personal Disposable Income 
1991 Change 1992 Change 1993 
£m % £m £m % £m £m 
Agriculture etc. 1794 15:Y. 284 2078 3 62 · 2140 . 
Non-Agricultural Wages, etc. 13620 5:Y. 783 14403 5 V. 756 15159 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 2824 1 28 2852 4 Y2 128 2980 
Total Income Received 18238 6 1095 19333 5 946 20279 
Current Transfers 4287 9:Y. 417 4704 6 V. 296 5000 
Gross Personal Income 22525 6:Y. 1512 24037 5 V. 1242 25279 . 
Direct Personal Taxes 4984 6:Y. 336 5320 6 y, 349 5669 
Personal Disposable Income 17541 6:Y. 1176 18717 4Y. 893 19610 
Consu1nption 15616 5:Y. 906 16522 4Y. 785 17307 . 
Personal Savings 1925 14 270 2195 5 108 2303 
Savings Ratio 11.0 11.7 11.7 
The personal savings ratio appears to have risen by almost %. per cent in 
1992, if our estimates of income and consumption are correct. Such a rise 
would be in keeping with the composition of income increases, including the 
payment of public service retrospection in the closing weeks of the year. It 
would also reflect the sharp fall in consumer confidence experienced in the last 
quarter of the year following its gradual rise in the earlier months. The reverse 
time pattern is likely to be seen in 1993, with consumer confidence very weak 
in the first qua,rter, followed by a gradual improvement in later quarters. For 
the year as a whole, it seems reasonable to assume that consumer confidence 
will be marginally weaker than in 1992. On the other hand, the composition 
of income increases is expected to be less savings-intensive. Thus an unchanged 
savings ratio is projected for 1993. On this basis, an increase of about 4%. per 
cent in the value of personal consumption would be compatible with our 
incomes forecasts. 
Consumer Prices 
The 3 per cent annual average rise in the consumer price index in 1992 
masked a substantial d~celeration in price inflation in the course of the year. 
The annualised quarterly change in the seasonally corrected index declined 
from over 3 per cent in the first half of 1992 to about 1 lt2 per cent in the second 
half of the year. But for the steep rise in mortgage interest rates, which added 
more than %. per cent to the index, there would have been an actual decline 
in the consumer pr~ce index in the quarter to November, as the effects of 
sterling devaluation began to be felt. 
Thus the carryover of price increases into 1993 is low. Mortgage interest rates 
are likely to decline after the first quarter, and there were only limited increases 
in indirect taxes in the Budget, which, being later than usual, will not have 
affected the February index. Against these factors tending to limit the rise in 
the consumer price index in 1993 must be placed · the possibility that seasonal 
food prices, particularly of potatoes, might increase again following their sharp 
fall in the summer of 1992, and, of course, the influence of currency 
movements. The devaluation of the Irish pound has brought the effective 
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exchange rate back to roughly where · it was in the first quarter of 1992. A 
substantial appreciation has so far been retained over sterling, which is the 
relevant currency for a large proportion of imported consumer goods. Even 
allowing for some recovery in the value of sterling in the course of the year, and 
for some increase in sterling prices, it does not appear probable that import 
prices will be a major source of inflation in 1993. 
For the year as a whole, therefore, there seems no reason to expect inflation, 
as measured by the consumer price index, to increase by more than 3 per cent. 
Ireland should thus remain among the· EC countries with a relatively low 
inflation rate in 1993. 
Public Finances 
Due partly to revenue weakness in the closing months, and partly to the 
decision to bring forward expenditure from 1993, the current budget deficit in 
1992 exceeded its target by just over £100 million. Nevertheless, at £446 million, 
or 1.8 per cent of GNP, it remained comfortably within the Maastricht 
guidelines, as did the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement at 2.8 per cent of 
GNP. 
The shifting of expenditure into 1992, and administrative arrangements to 
maintain the flow of VAT revenue in 1993 in spite of the ending of collection 
at point of entry, did much to relieve the expected pressure on the current 
budget deficit in 1993. Thus, according to the Budget arithmetic, it has been 
possible to restrict the expected rise in the deficit to £76 million, leaving the 
total at about 2 per cent of GNP, through a combination of relatively minor 
changes in tax and expenditure. 
Adjustments in VAT bands and increases in excise and stamp duties amount 
in aggregate to little more than the indexing of specific indirect tax rates. 
Changes in income tax allowances, exemptions and bands fall slightly short of 
the equivalent of full indexation, leaving the introduction of the 1 per cent 
income levy the principal addition to real tax rates. With regard to 
expenditure, the revised Estimates indicate a moderate rather than a drastic 
restriction on the growth of spending, both in constant and current price terms. 
If our general economic forecast is correct, there could be a slight shortfall 
in revenue receipts in 1993, as the Budget projections are based on more 
buoyant expectations of the value of consumer spending than we have forecast. 
The expenditure projections appear realistic, provided that strict control is 
maintained on day-to-day outlays. Fortunately, the target for the current 
budget deficit is sufficiently tight that a minor slippage would neither breach 
the Maastricht guidelines nor cause serious concern to the financial markets. 
The most important feature of the Budget is the very substantial increase 
proposed in capital expenditure. As already discussed, this should be sufficient 
to offset the decline expected in private capital spending, and thus ensure some 
increase in the volume of total fixed capital investment in 1993. While much 
of the increased capital requirements will come from higher EC funding, 
increased domestic resources are also postulated, including receipts of £150 
million from asset disposals. 
Assuming that both the expenditure and financing element of the capital 
budget are met, Exchequer borrowing for capital purposes will be slightly lower 
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than in 1992, in spite of the major increase in the volume of the Public Capital 
Programme. The budgeted increase in the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement 
is thus less than £50 million, and even the minor slippage which seems possible 
in the current budget deficit should .allow the EBR to be kept to about 3 per 
cent of GNP. Valuation changes due to devaluation will result in a _small 
deterioration in the debt GDP ratio, but this seems likely to be only a 
temporary interruption to the steady long-term process of reducing this key 
ratio. 
Interest Rates 
The assumption was made in the Autumn Commentary that Irish interest rates 
would fall rapidly during the winter months to end the first quarter of 1993 at 
approximately their pre-crisis levels. Obviously, this assumption ha,s not proved 
justified. Throughout December and January wholesale interest rates 
remained very high, with occasional surges in response to intensified currency 
speculation. Attention had to be focused on preventing further increases in 
retail interest rates, and reductions could not be considered. 
Even after devaluation, the need to recoup foreign exchange reserves, and 
the renewed depreciation of sterling, prevented an immediate and substantial 
lowering of wholesale and retail interest rates. More recently, a combin_ation of 
factors has permitted a signific.ant lowering of rates. Dqmestically, an adequate 
level of external reserves has been re-established, arid the Budget has removed 
fears of a loss of fiscal discipline. Abroad, the Bundesbank has initiated a 
process, however gradual, of reducing German interest rates, the degree of 
FIGURE 4: Interest Rates 
Per cent per annum, Quarterly Averages 
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speculation against the parities, and perhaps even the structure, of the ERM 
has abated, and the value of sterling has appreciated. 
While occasional relapses in the external factors, such as renewed ERM 
speculation after the French elections or a renewed depreciation of sterling, 
cannot be ruled out, in general conditions over the coming months should be 
conducive to a further substantial reduction in Irish interest rates. By the end 
of the second quarter, German interest rates should be significantly lower than 
their mid-1992 level. Allowing for the wider differential over German rates, Irish 
wholesale interest rates are thus likely to have returned roughly to their mid-1992 
levels. Retail interest rates might be rather slower to decline than wholesale, as 
lending institutions attempt to compensate for the_ loss of margins suffered during 
the winter when the rise in wholesale rates was not fully passed on. 
One of the legacies of devaluation is that the differential over German levels 
of both wholesale and long-term interest rates is likely to remain higher than 
in the period preceding the September 1992 currency crisis. However, provided 
the start made by the Budget in signalling Ireland's determination to defend 
its new ERM parity is resolutely followed through, particularly during any 
periods of temporary sterling weakness, there seems no reason why the 
additional differential should be large. It is certainly reasonable to expect that 
the current differential on short-term wholesale interest rates will be 
significantly eroded by the end of the year. This narrowing of the differential, 
together with the restoration of a normal relationship between wholesale and 
retail rates and a continued easing of German monetary policy, should permit 
Irish retail interest rates to fall below pre-crisis levels in the second half of 1993. 
For the year as a whole, average retail rates, including the mortgage rate, could 
thus be marginally lower than the 1992 average. 
General Assessment 
In the Autumn Commentary, the overriding policy imperative was identified 
as an almost immediate reduction in short-term interest rates. The preferred 
policy method of achieving this was an adjustment package which would enable 
the economy to compete effectively at the existing exchange rate. 
In the event, neither government, potential government parties, nor the 
trade unions appeared willing to implement the cost reductions needed to make 
such a strategy work. At the same time, external instability, in terms of pressure 
on the ERM and fluctuations in the value of sterling, proved more persistent 
than might have been expected. This combination of internal and external 
factors not only ruled out the early reduction of interest rates but contributed 
to the pressure for a further substantial increase in the already crisis levels of 
mortgage and other retail rates. 
The prospect of even higher interest rates for an indefinite period made the 
decision to devalue the Irish pound inescapable. Whatever the arguments 
about the effect on long-term interest differentials of alternative currency 
strategies, the near certainty of large-scale job losses if the immediate interest 
rate crisis was not resolved was rightly seen as unacceptable. 
This relationship between excessive interest rates and employment prospects 
is central to an understanding of policy issues in the first half of 1993. Despite 
the inevitable rhetoric in the election campaign about reducing the level of 
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unemployment, the continuation for several months of real interest rates far 
above the historical norm or those in competing countries meant that the initial 
actions of the new government had to be defensive rather than offensive. There 
was a serious danger, still not fully averted, that the increase in unemployment 
would accelerate as businesses failed or laid off a high proportion of their 
workforce. 
To prevent such a catastrophe, it was, and is, necessary to address the twin 
problems of competitiveness and of interest rates. In ' the absence of ·a cost-
cutting package, devaluation was the necessary first step in tackling the issue 
of competitiveness and in making possible a reduction in interest rates. 
However, devaluation alone was unlikely to solve the interest rate problem. 
Confidence needed to be established that the hard currency strategy had 
undergone a forced modification, rather than been abandoned, and that the 
Maastricht fiscal targets remained in place. 
Given that domestic cost adjustments were not to be made, and that currency 
speculation showed no sign of abating, devaluation was perhaps delayed too 
long. However, the long battle to preserve the Irish ERM parity following 
sterling's withdrawal from the mechanism was itself a necessary affirmation of 
Ireland's determination to pursue a strong currency policy and to participate 
in any moves towards de facto monetary union. The final admission that the old 
parity could not be held, in the face of yet another reduction in UK interest 
rates and consequent sterling depreciation, was not, in the circumstances, a 
signal that the strategy had been changed. To demonstrate this_ continuity of 
strategy, it was also necessary that the devaluation was within the ERM, and 
was of a size which would remove speculative pressure without attempting to 
restore t_he Irish pound/sterling exchange rate to its pre-crisis level. 
Any element of the alternative strategy, such as a much earlier devaluation, 
a decision to float rather than remain with the ERM, or an·attempt to restore 
the August 1992 relationship with sterling, would have indicated that economic 
links with the UK remain paramount, and that the progress made over the 
previous decade or so towards moving from being an economic satellite of the 
UK to becoming an integrated part of the European economy had been 
illusory. There might have been short-term gains from such a strategy switch, 
but the long-term costs would have been unacceptably high. Although the UK 
might well achieve one of the highest growth rates in the EC in 1993, because 
it is recovering from the earliest and deepest recession, its medium to long-term 
prospects remain among the weakest in the Community. Once the initial]-
curve effects have been worked off, the balance of payments constraint on UK 
growth is likely to have been temporarily eased by the depreciation of sterling. 
However, it has by no means been removed, and there is a strong likelihood 
that over the next five years UK growth will be slower and more erratic than 
in the rest of the EC, and that the UK will be forced to maintain interest rates 
considerably above the European norm. Thus, while the UK will inevitably 
remain the largest single market for Irish exports, the process of trade diver-
sification towards Europe should be encouraged and the financial decoupling 
from London should be continued, at least until such time as there is irrevoc-
able movement towards European Monetary Union including the UK. 
While the devaluation itself met the requirements for re-establishing a strong . 
ERM currency strategy, further action was, and still is, needed to reinforce 
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market perceptions that such a strategy is in place. At the technical level of 
currency management it was important that the external reserves should be 
restored to normal levels before any attempt was made to force down domestic 
interest rates. This re-building of reserves now appears to have been 
accomplished. It will also be necessary to demonstrate determination to defend 
the new ERM parity during any future bout of speculation, whether 
occasioned by further ERM realignments or by a temporary depreciation of 
sterling. If required, there must be a willingness to reverse, promptly but 
temporarily, the process of reducing domestic interest rates. 
However, although strong currency management, including the appropriate 
use of monetary policy, will remain a requirement in restoring full confidence 
and thus reducing the interest rates differential, it is by no means sufficient. 
General economic management is likely to prove even more critical in the full 
restoration of market confidence. 
One aspect of economic management is fiscal policy. A perception that there 
was a weakening of policy in relation to medium term fiscal targets could 
undermine confidence and place upward pressure on interest rates. The danger 
of such a perception arising with regard to any country is inevitably more acute 
when there is a change of government, especially when the new government 
contains a left of centre party. Thus the incorporation of relatively tight, but 
credible, fiscal targets in the new government's first Budget was a necessary first . 
step in retaining market confidence in economic policy. Even the alleged lack 
of imagination in the tax and current expenditure provisions of the Budget 
could have been advantageous, as the markets have frequently proved chary of 
imaginative fiscal initiatives. 
While the timing and extent of recent interest rate reductions provides 
evidence that the Budget was successful, in its primary aim of reassuring the 
markets concerning fiscal policy, this d10.._es not mean that full confidence in 
economic management has been established. Quite apart from fiscal 
responsibility, the markets are traditionally concerned with inflation trends, 
and more recently have come to regard unemployment levels as one of the 
fundamental indicators of economic performance. 
Thus the main requirement of economic policy in the remainder of 1993 is 
to convince both the markets and the general public that inflation will remain 
under control and that an effective employment strategy is emerging. 
Central to this task is the evolution of a pay policy which will ensure that 
international competitiveness will be at least maintained, and that when the 
economic upturn arrives the competitive benefits of devaluation will not be 
dissipated in a round of inflationary pay increases. To this end, the negotiation 
of an agreement to follow the PESP, which expires this year, could be helpful, 
but only if its pay elements are realistically moderate. In the context of current 
international trends this implies lower annual pay increases than those 
contained in the current PESP, and a greater potential for flexibility in the face 
of unforeseen external shocks. 
A vital sub-set in overall pay policy is the question of public service pay 
determination. The application of the existing system of arbitration has 
resulted in rigidities, inequities and severe pressure on the public finances. 
Substantial modification to the system is overdue, and the discussions on this 
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issue are among the most important matters facing the government this year. 
Clearly the principles of arbitration and of outside comparisons remain valid, 
but the interpretation must be made more flexible, with much greater account 
taken of productivity considerations in both the appl_icant and reference 
groups, of ability to pay, and of market tr_ends as manifested in the level of 
qualified applicants for job vacancies or the difficulty of retaining staff . . 
Obviously, pay moderation and reformed bargaining structures do not add 
up to an employment strategy, and many other measures to improve lon.g-term 
economic structure are needed. However, in a small open economy with a 
public finance constraint there is a direct trade-off between pay levels and 
employment, in both the trading and the public sectors. The guidelines set in 
1993 for the determination of pay increases in the coming years could have a 
considerable influence on the pace of net job creation in those years. 
In summary, 1993 still seems likely to be a very difficult year for the Irish 
economy. The short-term prognosis is full of uncertainties, but it seems most. 
probable that the immediate task of policy will be to limit job losses rather than 
to achieve an early reduction in unemployment. However, the prospects for 
succeeding years are much brighter. If there is an up-turn in the world 
economy, the Irish economy seems competitively well placed to benefit, as it 
was after the 1986 devaluation. Although it is far too early to be certain, there 
is a real possibility that 1994 could see the beginning of a sustained period of 
rapid growth in the Irish economy. Policy decisions in 1993 should be geared 
to ensuring that this growth is non-inflationary and translates as fully as 
possible into increased employment. 
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Output Indicators Employment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Total Modern Tradi- Elec- Houses Total Modern Tradi-
Manufac· Manufac- tional tricity Com- Manufac- Manufac- tional 
turing turing Manufac- Output pleted turing luring Manufac-
turing luring 
1985 = 1985 = 1985 = G.W.H. Total 'OOOs 'OOOs 'OOOs 
100 100 100 Number 
1985 100.0 100.0 100.0 11919 23948 186.9 39.4 147 .5 
1986 102.9 107. 1 99.9 12466 22680 184.2 40.2 143 .8 
1987 113.6 132.7 101.4 12866 18450 182.4 41.1 141.2 
1988 127.6 161.9 105.8 13068 15654 182.9 43.2 139.7 
1989 142.5 · 188.9 l 12.3 13640 18068 187.0 45.3 141.8 
1990 149.2 197.9 117.6 14325 19539 193.0 48.3 144.8 
1991 153.9 208.6 l 18.0 14990 19652 194.6 50.4 144.2 
1992 
Quarterly Averages or Totals 
19B9 I 139.2 192.6 102.3 3522 3663 182.5 43. 7 138.8 
II 147.3 196.5 112.7 3250 4203 184.9 44.5 140.5 
III 132.1 166.3 105 .6 3160 5467 189.8 46.5 143.5 
IV 151.8 195.5 117.8 3708 4735 190.8 46.6 144.2 
1990 I 147 .6 202 .8 108.0 3782 4372 189.2 45.9 . 143.6 
II 153.3 202.6 119.0 3368 4667 191.9 47.2 144.9 
III 139.8 180.8 109.5 3272 5313 195.6 49.9 145 .5 
IV 156.3 200.0 121.8 3903 5187 195.4 50.3 145.2 
1991 I 154.2 215.3 110.5 4018 4785 192.6 49.2 143.3 
II 156. l 209.3 118.4 3484 4164 193.7 49.4 144.4 
III Hl.9 186.0 109.8 3455 5228 195.6 50.8 144.8 
IV 163.8 218.7 121.2 4033 5475 196.4 52.1 144.1 
1992 [ 167.6 245.9 113.2 4187 4372 191.9 51.l 141.0 
II 173.4 245.6 122.5 3644 5920 193.1 50.8 142.5 
III 161.0 227.5 113.9 3602 6284 195.4 52.1 143 .4 
IV 
Quarterly Averages or Totals (Seasonally Corrected) 
1989 I 138.5 182.2 106.2 3243 No 184.3 44.3 140.0 
II 140.9 186. 7 108.6 3455 Seasonal 185.8 45.1 140.7 
III 113.9 185.0 111.2 3458 Pat tern. 188.0 45.9 142.4 
IV 146.9 197.1 l 12.0 3495 189.B 46.0 143.8 
1990 I 146.4 191. l l 12.4 3488 191.2 46.6 114.9 
II 147.3 19•LO 114.8 3584 192.8 47.9 145.l 
III 152.3 200.9 115.1 3577 193. 7 49.2 144.5 
IV 151.3 201. l l 15.8 3676 194.3 49.6 144.7 
1991 I 152.9 202.2 l 15 . l 3708 194. 7 49.9 144.7 
II 150.8 201.7 114.3 3709 191.6 50.1 144.5 
III 154.0 206.2 115.3 3777 193 .7 50.l 143.9 
IV 158.G 219.7 115.2 3796 195.2 51.4 143.5 
1992 [ 165.9 230.6 117.9 3864 194.0 51.9 142.4 
II 167.6 237.2 118.4 3879 194.l 51.5 142.6 
III l 74. 1 252.0 119.4 3939 193.5 51.4 142.5 
IV 
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Money Real 
Output per Head Earnings Earnings Unemployment 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Total Modern Tradi- Manufac- -Manufac- Live Reg- Live Reg- Live Reg-
Manufac- Manufac- tional turing luring ister ister ister 
luring luring Manufac- Male Female Total 
turing 
1985 = 1985 = 1985 = 1989 = 1989 = 'OOOs 'OOOs 'OOOs 
100 100 100 100 100 Av. Av. Av. 
Av. Av. Monthly Monthly Monthly 
Weekly Weekly 
100.0 100.0 100.0 81.3 92.5 170.2 60.4 230.6 1985 
104.4 104.8 102.5 87.3 95. 7 172.0 64.4 236.4 1986 
116.4 127.2 106.0 91.8 97.6 176.2 71.1 247.3 1987 
130.4 147.6 111.7 96.1 100.0 169.7 71.7 241.4 1988 
142.4 164.1 116.9 100.0 100.0 160.0 71.6 231.6 1989 
144.5 161.2 119.9 103.9 100.5 152.1 72.6 224.7 1990 
147.8 163.0 120.8 108.4 101. 7 170.5 83.5 253.9 1991 
187.2 96.0 283.1 1992 
Quarterly Averages 
142.6 173.5 108.7 97.9 99.6 169.5 73.0 242.6 1989 I 
148.9 173.8 118.3 99.1 99.8 159.7 70.9 230.7 II 
130.1 140.9 108.6 100.9 100.1 155.9 72. 7 228.6 III 
148.7 165.2 120.6 102.1 100.5 154.7 69.7 224.4 IV 
145.8 174.0 110.9 100.9 98.5 158.3 71.7 230.0 1990 I 
149.3 169.0 121.2 103.1 100.3 148.2 71.2 219.4 II 
133.6 142.6 111.1 105.1 101.3 149.7 75.0 224.7 III 
149.5 156.6 123.8 106.3 101.9 152.1 72.6 224. 7 IV 
149. 7 172.3 113.8 105.5 100.3 165.8 77.9 243. 7 1991 I 
150.6 166.9 120.9 108.7 102.6 167.2 81.1 248.3 II 
135.6 144.2 111.9 108.6 101.1 173.1 88. 7 261.8 III 
155.9 165.3 124.1 110.9 102.6 175.7 86.3 262.0 IV 
163.3 189.5 118.4 109.6 100.6 186. 7 91.4 278.1 1992 I 
167.9 190.3 126.9 112.5 102.5 183.9 93.1 277.0 II 
154.0 171.9 117 .1 112.3 101.7 188.5 101.8 290.2 III 
189.5 97.6 287.2 IV 
Quarterly Averages (Seasonally Corrected) 
139.9 162.9 111.8 98.8 100.6 164.0 72.7 236.8 1989 I 
142.3 163.0 113.8 99.1 99.7 161.4 71.9 233.2 II 
142.1 158.5 115.2 100.6 99.9 158.0 70. 7 228.6 Ill 
145.9 168.8 115.0 101.4 99.7 156.4 71.2 227.6 IV 
142.8 162.2 114.3 102.0 99.5 152.9 71.4 224.4 1990 I 
143.3 159.8 116.8 103.0 100.1 149.9 72.1 222.0 II 
145.9 160.5 117.5 104.8 101.2 151.4 72.8 224.2 Ill 
146.4 159.6 118.1 105.5 101.1 154.1 74.3 228.3 IV 
146.3 159.9 117.3 106. 7 101.5 160.4 77.6 238.0 1991 I 
145.0 158.9 116.7 108.5 102.3 169.0 82.0 250.9 II 
148.0 161.9 118.2 108.4 101.1 174.7 86.3 260.9 Ill 
152.6 168.4 118.4 110.1 101.8 177.9 88.1 266.0 IV 
159.4 175.5 122.2 111.0 101.8 181.4 91.1 272.5 1992 I 
161.9 181. 7 122.5 112.3 102.1 185.6 93.9 279.6 II 
167.9 192.9 123.6 112.1 101.7 189.9 99.3 289.2 Ill 
191.8 99.6 291.3 IV 
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Prices 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Output General 
!Consumer Price Wholesale Agricul- Import Export Terms Price of 
Price Index Price tural Price Unit Unit of Stocks + 
Index Manufac- Index Index Value Value Trade Shares 
turing (ISEQ) 
Nov. 1985 = 1985 = 1985 = 1985 = 1985 = 1985 = Jan . 
1989 = 100 100 100 100 100 100 1988 = 
100 1000 
1985 86.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 580.4 
1986 89.8 98.8 97.8 99.5 88.8 92. 7 104.3 907.7 
1987 92.6 100.4 98.4 103.5 88.8 92. 7 104.4 1326.2 
1988 94.6 104.5 102.4 114.4 94.6 99.3 105.0 1294.6 
1989 98.5 109.5 108.1 120.1 100.7 105.9 105.1 1633.6 
1990 101.7 107.8 105.1 106.5 95.7 95.9 100.2 1562.2 
1991 105.0 108.7 106.4 103 .1 97.9 95.2 97.2 1382.4 
1992 108.2 110.5 106.1 1311.1 
Quarterly Averages 
1989 I 96.8 108.2 107.2 121.2 100.9 104.3 103.4 1473.5 
II 97.8 109.7 108.4 125.1 101.4 106.4 104.9 1638.9 
Ill 99.2 110.5 109.0 121.0 101.7 108.0 106.2 1710.6 
IV 100.0 109.7 107.7 116.7 98.7 104.3 105.6 1711.3 
1990 I 100.9 108.4 105.8 115.6 95.4 100.0 104.8 1813.2 
II 101.2 107.9 104.6 111.4 92.3 97.9 106.1 1673.2 
Ill 102.1 108.0 105.4 103.4 96.5 95.8 99.3 1523.7 
IV 102.7 106.7 104.7 101.2 97.8 92.5 94.6 1238.8 
1991 I 103.5 107.3 105.1 104.9 96.7 93.0 96.1 1241.3 
II 104.3 108.8 106.4 106.1 97.2 93.8 96.5 1466.9 
Ill 105.7 109.2 106.9 101.6 98.4 95.6 97.1 1413.3 
IV 106.4 109.5 107.3 103.6 98.5 96.1 97.6 1408.3 
1992 I 107.3 110.2 107.8 107.4 97.7 95.2 97.4 1426.9 
II 108.1 111.3 108.3 109.7 97.0 97.9 101.0 1389.8 
Ill 108.7 ' 110.6 107.2 106.7 94.7 93.4 98.7 1263 . 1 
IV 108.9 109.8 104.5 1164.'5 
Quarterly Averages (Seasonally Corrected) 
1989 I 96.7 108.4 107.4 119.4 No No No No 
II 97 .8 109.4 108.4 122.8 Seasonal Seasonal Seasonal Seasonal 
Ill 99.1 110.2 108.7 122.7 Pattern Pattern Pattern Pattern 
IV 100. 1 110.1 107.8 119.0 
1990 [ 100.8 108.7 106.0 114.0 
II 101.3 107.6 104.6 109.2 
Ill 102.0 107.7 105.1 104.9 
IV 102.8 107.0 104.8 103. 1 
1991 I 103.5 107.6 105.3 103.6 
II 104.4 108.5 106.4 104.1 
Ill 105.6 108.9 106.7 103.1 
IV 106.4 109.8 107.4 105.5 
1992 I 107.3 110.5 108.0 106.0 
II 108.2 110.9 108.2 107.5 
Ill 108.6 110.3 106.9 108.3 
IV 108.9 110.2 106.4 
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Consumption Government Interest Indicators Rates 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
1 month Long 
New Cars Retail Retail Current Current Current inter term 
Regis- Sales Sales Revenue Expendi- Deficit bank Gilt 
tered Value Volume ture Rate Rate 
Total 1980 = 1980 = £m £m £m Per cent Per cent 
100 100 per per 
annum annum 
59592 155.9 91.0 6331 7615 1284 11.9 12.6 1985 
58760 158.8 90.5 6709 8104 1395 12.4 11.1 1986 
54341 161.3 89.3 7152 8332 1180 10.8 11.3 1987 
61888 169.1 91.1 7690 8006 317 7.8 9.5 1988 
78383 184.5 95.4 7756 8019 263 9.6 8.9 1989 
83407 193.5 98 .0 8269 8421 152 11.1 10.1 1990 
68533 197.0 97.8 8776 9076 300 10.4 9.3 1991 
67745 9360 9806,, 446 15.2 9.1 1992 
Quarterly Averages or Totals 
25672 177.1 93.2 1807 2057 250 7.8 8.7 1989 I 
25536 182.3 94.6 1812 2011 199 9.2 9.1 II 
18192 181.4 93.2 2008 1924 -84 9.8 8.8 III 
8983 195.9 99.8 2129 2027 - 102 11.4 9.2 IV 
27830 189.9 96.6 1872 2236 364 11.9 10.2 1990 I 
27883 189.8 96.8 2004 2036 32 11.0 10.0 II 
18928 190.9 96.9 2101 1970 - 131 10.8 10.2 III 
8766 201.6 100.8 2293 2180 - 113 10.6 10.0 IV 
23797 191.8 95.9 1886 2313 427 11.1 9.3 1991 I 
22979 191 .2 95.5 2074 2390 316 10.3 9.1 II 
15051 194.4 96.3 2295 2071 - 224 9. 7 9.6 III 
6706 208 .7 102.6 2521 2302 -219 10.4 9.0 IV 
24058 200.6 98.2 2055 2538 483 10.6 8.7 1992 I 
20193 203.4 99.0 2299 2374 75 10.2 8.8 II 
16802 206. 7 100.3 2473 2307 - 166 14.0 9.3 III 
6692 215 .6 2533 2587 54 25.8 9.6 IV 
Quarterly Averages or Totals (Seasonally Corrected) 
19257 179.9 94. 7 2017 1951 -66 No No 1989 I 
19698 184.5 95.7 1847 2019 172 Seasonal Seasonal II 
19805 184.5 94.6 2032 2055 23 Pattern Pattern III 
20095 187.8 95 .9 1879 2007 127 IV 
20926 192.6 98.1 2074 2109 35 1990 I 
21311 191.8 97. 7 2069 2047 - 22 II 
20584 194.5 98 .5 2089 2104 15 III 
20025 193.3 96.9 2048 2168 120 IV 
17913 194.4 97.3 2080 2171 91 1991 I 
17459 193.3 96.4 2155 2405 250 II 
16337 198.1 97.9 2253 2216 - 37 III 
15529 200.3 98.7 2270 2289 19 IV 
18134 203.2 99.5 2264 2377 114 1992 I 
15280 205.8 100.0 2391 2389 -2 II 
18245 210 .5 102.0 2415 2474 59 III 
15578 207.2 2294 2570 276 IV 
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Monetary Developments Exchange Rates 
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
Licensed Banks 
Money Domestic Credit External Effective Sterling Dollar Deutsch-
Supply Reserves Index mark 
M3 Gov. Non-Gov. 
£m £m £m £m 
End End End End Dec. 1971 Per IR£ Per IR£ Per IR£ 
Period Period Period Period = 100 
1985 8924.8 25 14.1 8441.1 2271.9 62.41 0.8234 1.0659 3.1134 
1986 8836.9 2725 . 7 9065.5 2205.3 66.65 0.9147 1.3424 . 2.9080 
1987 9799 .5 2754.9 9494.5 2821.4 66.15 0.9089 1.4879 2.6717 
1988 10421.0 2636.4 10853.4 3161.0 65 .08 0.8568 1.5249 2.6743 
1989 10945.0 2417.7 12538.3 2521.0 64.39 0.8665 1.4175 2.6650 
1990 12540. 7 2506.0 13855.9 2891. 7 68 .31 0.9302 1.6585 2.6729 
1991 13024.6 2502.2 13553.2 3256.0 67.33 0.9131 1.6144 2.6710 
1992 14203 .3 2946. 7 14410.7 2112.8 69.48 0.9692 1.7073 2.6562 
End-Period Totals Quarte~ly Averages 
1989 I 10231. 7 2435.4 11057.8 2735.8 63.49 0.8262 1.4440 2.6708 
II 10506.9 2302.0 11764.9 2497.5 63 .64 0.8500 1.3831 2.6698. 
Ill 10712.5 2350. 7 11815.0 2886 . 7 64.21 0.8693 1.3877 2.6691 
IV 10945.0 2417.7 12538.3 2521.0 66.32 0.9226 1.4621 2.6490 
1990 I 11289.9 2526.0 12681.5 2457.8 68.07 0.9475 1.5703 2.6539 
II 11381.6 2506.6 13082.8 3097 .3 68.73 0.9542 1.5981 2.6809 
III 12421.6 2454. 7 13230.6 3705.6 67.85 0.9046 1.6850 2.6828 
IV 12540. 7 2506.0 13855.9 2891. 7 68.65 0.9154 1.7817 2.6735 
1991 I 12187 .3 2382.0 13776. 7 3200.9 68.28 0.9126 1.7429 2.6646 
II 12306.1 2288.9 13928. 7 3422.0 66 .55 0.9038 1.5430 2.6753 
III 12650.2 2380.5 13973.3 3471.2 66.68 0.9108 1.5355 2.6740 
IV 13024.6 2502.2 13553.2 3256.0 67 .87 0.9257 1.6433 2.6693 
1992 I 12555.4 2399.4 13614.2 3495.8 67.97 0.9303 1.6479 2.6663 
II 12960.9 2449.1 13685.4 3223 .6 67 .63 0.9156 1.6555 2.6691 
III 12998.8 2792.2 14010.9 2130.2 69 .81 0.9538 1.8160 2.6528 
IV 14203.3 2946. 7 14410.7 2112.8 72 .50 1.0784 1.7053 2.6363 
End-Period Totals (S.C.) Quarterly Averages (S.C .) 
1989 I 
II No No No No No No No No 
III Seasonal Seasonal Seasonal Seasonal Seasonal Seasonal Seasonal Seasonal 
IV Pattern Pattern Pattern Pattern Pattern Pattern Pattern Pattern 
1990 I 
II 
III 
IV 
1991 I 
II 
III 
IV 
1992 I 
II 
III 
IV 
38 
Balance of 
Visible Trade Indicators Payments 
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 
Imports Exports Trade Imports Exports Net Current Surplus Factor Account (Value) (Value) (Value) (Volume) (Volume) Flows 
£m £m £m 1985 = 1985 = £m £m 
100 100 
9428.2 9743.0 314.8 100.0 100.0 -1967 
-650 1985 
8621.3 9374.3 753.0 103.0 104.0 - 2017 -611 1986 
9155.2 10723.5 1568.3 109.4 118.8 -2113 -60 1987 
10214.8 12304.8 2090.1 114.5 127.1 - 2663 62 1988 
12284.3 14597.0 2312.8 129.3 141.4 - 3233 -348 1989 
12479.5 14343.0 1863.5 138.3 153.5 - 3131 37 1990 
12853.4 15024.6 2171.3 139.2 162.0 - 2864 925 1991 
13199.3 16624.5 3425.2 1992 
Av. Monthly Totals Quarterly Averages or Totals 
1003.0 1118.7 115.7 126.5 131.8 - 660 -2 1989 I 
1042.8 1270.6 227.8 130. 7 146.9 -972 - 204 II 
974.5 1214.9 240.4 121.9 138.3 - 607 217 Ill 
1075. 7 1261.4 185.8 138.5 149.1 -994 -359 IV 
1043. 7 1218.1 174.4 138.7 149.9 - 773 61 1990 I 
1048.0 1257.2 209.2 144.4 158.1 -818 - 56 II 
995.8 1110.4 114. 7 131.3 142. 7 -630 190 Ill 
1071.1 1195.2 124.1 139.4 159.2 -910 -158 IV 
1073.4 1173.5 100.1 141.4 155.4 - 655 -16 1991 I 
1072.2 1258.6 186.4 140.5 165.2 - 845 -90 II 
1036.1 1228.0 191.8 134.0 158.2 - 550 751 Ill 
1104.0 1347.8 243.8 142.6 172.6 -814 279 IV 
1109.1 1347.2 238.1 144.4 174.3 - 713 418 1992 I 
1106.9 1453.5 346. 7 145.2 182. 7 -832 333 II 
1060.5 1338.6 278.1 142.5 176. 7 Ill 
1122. 7 1402.9 280.2 IV 
Av. Monthly Totals (S.C.) Quarterly Averages or Totals (S.C.) 
981.9 1164.5 182.7 124.1 137.8 No No 1989 I 
1046.6 1231.3 184.7 130.4 142.1 Seasonal Seasonal II 
1036.8 1237.0 200.2 130.5 141.9 Pattern Pattern Ill 
1043.3 1240.1 196.8 134.2 145.1 IV 
1021.7 1244.5 222.8 136.1 153.6 1990 I 
1049.2 1219. 7 170.5 143.8 153.1 II 
1058.8 1149.3 90.5 140.4 148.9 Ill 
1028.5 1176.6 148.2 133.8 155.3 IV 
1068.2 1201.4 134.9 140.6 159.4 1991 I 
1072.3 1215. 7 143.8 139.6 159.4 II 
1085.5 1277. 7 192.2 141. 7 166.4 Ill 
1062. 7 1317.0 254.3 136.3 166.9 IV 
1084.6 1369. 7 285.1 141.6 177. 7 1992 I 
1106.0 1405.2 299.1 144.3 176.3 II 
1106.9 1379.4 272.4 150.8 183.8 Ill 
1098.5 1379.1 280.6 IV 
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